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I

NOTE

I

The Equal Protection Clause - State
Statutory Restrictions on the Education
of Illegal Alien Children
-

Proposition 187
Section 7 of California's Proposition 187 is designed to prevent
illegal alien children from attending California public schools.1 In
Plyler v. Doe,2 the Supreme Court held that a similar statute,
denying a free public education to illegal alien children in Texas,3

1. 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 187 (no page numbers available) (West).
Section 7 of Proposition 187 concerns elementary and secondary education. It
amends California law by adding a new section 48215 to the California Education
Code. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48215 (West 1995).
Subsequent references in footnotes to section 7, including subsections, will cite
to section 48215. However, to conform to the district court's practice in litigation
over Proposition 187 (see infra note 10), the text refers to portions of Proposition
187 by their section numbers in the Proposition, rather than by their section
numbers in the California Code. There are no references in the text to
subsections.
Section 48215(a) requires California public elementary and secondary schools
to refuse admission to: children who are not citizens; aliens not lawfully admitted
as permanent residents; or persons not otherwise authorized to be in the United
States.
2. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
3. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (West 1995). In effect, this provision
establishes a class of children who are neither citizens nor legally admitted aliens,
and who are not entitled to attend school in Texas free of tuition, as are other
children in the state.
The Court in Plyler speaks of "undocumented school-age children." Id. at
206. This note generally uses the term "illegal alien children." The reader should
be aware that the term is not intended to precisely define the class affected in the
cases discussed, but is used for convenience.
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violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 This note predicts that if the Supreme Court considers the
constitutionality of Proposition 187 it will rely on Plyler to strike
down section 7 of the Proposition. However, this note also
suggests that Plyler applied a confusing and unnecessary standard
which should be abandoned.
California has been greatly affected by illegal immigration; one
estimate is that nearly half the illegal aliens in the United States
are living in that state.5 Proposition 187 was proposed as a
reaction to the high cost of providing public education and other
social services to large numbers of illegal aliens.6
Section 7 of Proposition 187 deals specifically with elementary
and secondary education. It requires California school districts to
verify the immigration status of children who enroll in or attend
public school. 7 If a school district determines, or reasonably
suspects, a violation of federal immigration laws by a child, parent,
or guardian, section 7 requires that the district make a report to
state and federal law enforcement authorities s
Proposition 187 was enacted on November 8, 1994.' Soon
thereafter, several suits challenging the constitutionality of
Proposition 187 were filed in federal district court. Ultimately,
these suits were consolidated as League of United Latin American
Citizens v. Wilson.1°
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. United States General Accounting Office, Illegal Aliens: Assessing
Estimates of FinancialBurden on California,GAO/HEHS-95-22, Nov. 28, 1994.
6. Robert L. Jackson, New Study on Immigration Cites High Cost, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 23, 1994, at A3.
7. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48215(b), (c). The school district must also verify the
immigration status of each child's parent or legal guardian. Id. § 48215(d).
8. Id. § 48215(e). The district must also notify the child's parent or guardian
that, if the child's legal status is not established within 90 days, the child may not
attend the school. Id. If the child is not able to establish legal status in the
United States, the school district must continue to provide education for the child
during the 90 days and help with the child's transition to a school in his or her
country of origin. Id. § 48215(0.
9. Proposition 187 was added to the ballot pursuant to California's initiative
procedure, which requires a measure to be submitted to the voters when supported
by a petition signed by a number of voters equal to at least five percent of the
votes cast for governor in the last election. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8. California
voters passed Proposition 187 by a vote of 59 percent to 41 percent. Roberto
Suro, Two CaliforniaJudges Block Anti-Immigrant Measure at the Start, WASH.
POST, Nov. 10, 1994, at A39.
10. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, No. CV 94-7569
MRP, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17720 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 1995). Among the
plaintiffs in the consolidated cases were a class of people who would be questioned
regarding their citizenship or immigration status, or who would be ineligible for
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One of the arguments put forth by the plaintiffs in Wilson was
that the law violated the Equal Protection Clause, which prohibits
states from denying Equal Protection of the law to any persons
within the jurisdiction of the state." The plaintiffs also argued
that federal law governing immigration preempted the states'
authority to enact laws with the same effect, under the Supremacy
Clause. 2
In May 1995, plaintiffs filed a motion ,for summary judgment.13 The District Court for the Central District of California,
in November 1995, granted the motion in Wilson, and enjoined the
state from enforcing section 7 of Proposition 187, finding that it is
unconstitutional. 4 The district court relied on a Supremacy
Clause analysis,15 rather than an Equal Protection analysis, to find
that most of the provisions of Proposition 187 conflict with federal
immigration law and are therefore unconstitutional. 6 However,
the court struck down section 7 of Proposition8 187 specifically on
17
Equal Protection grounds, relying on Plyler1

public services, as part of the enforcement of Proposition 187. Id. at *2.
11. Id. at *80-84. In practice, the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a state
from subjecting one class of people to legal treatment different from that received
by other classes without adequate justification. See Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic
Equal ProtectionAnalysis, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 121 (1989).
12. Wilson at *4-5, 19.
13. Id. at *4.
14. Id. at *87. Earlier, the court granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction prohibiting the enforcement of section 7 as well as other parts of
Proposition 187. Id. at *4. In ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the
court ordered that the preliminary injunction was to remain in effect until further
order. Id. Thus, as of this writing, the state has never been able to enforce the
portions of Proposition 187 covered by the injunction.
15. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
16. Wilson at *86-87. The Supremacy Clause "requires the invalidation of any
state legislation that burdens or conflicts in any manner with any federal laws or
treaties." DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357 n.5 (1976).
17. Wilson at *41, 80-84. In discussing the unconstitutionality of section 7, the
court uses the term "preemption." Elsewhere in the decision, the same term is
used to describe the effect of the Supremacy Clause, under which federal law
preempts conflicting state law. However, it seems clear that in striking down
section 7 the court is relying primarily on an Equal Protection analysis:
[A]n analysis of section 7 under [case law dealing with the Supremacy
Clause] is not necessary to sustain the Court's ruling.... In light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Plyler v. Doe .. . in which the Court held

that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits.
states from excluding undocumented alien children from public schools,
section 7 in its entirety conflicts with and is therefore preempted by
federal law.
Id.
18. Id. at *80.
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Because the district court relies on an Equal Protection
analysis to find section 7 unconstitutional, 9 that analysis is likely
to be an issue on appeal.2' This note therefore discusses section
7 and the Equal Protection Clause.
In order to determine whether state classifications violate the
Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court measures those
actions against three different standards. The Court decides which
standard to apply in a particular case based on the nature of the
right that is affected and the criteria used by the state to distinguish
between classes.
If the right affected by a state action is "explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution," it is considered to be fundamental.2 1 in such cases, the Court applies a strict judicial scrutiny
standard. Under this standard, state action that denies or limits a
fundamental right to one class of people while not subjecting other
classes to the same restriction is presumed to be unconstitutional.22 To overcome this presumption under the strict scrutiny
standard, the state must demonstrate that its action was
precisely
23
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.
The same strict scrutiny standard applies, also resulting in a
presumption of unconstitutionality, if the state classifies people
based on criteria such as resident alien status, nationality, or race.
Such classifications are "inherently suspect' 24 because they are
"more likely than others to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather
than legislative rationality in pursuit of some legitimate objective.
Again, to overcome the presumption of unconstitutionality, the state must show that its action is precisely tailored to meet
a compelling interest.
If the right affected is not fundamental and none of the classes
created is suspect, the Court ordinarily applies the "traditional
standard. ''26 This "requires only that the state's system be shown

19. Id. at *40-41.
20. The press has reported that the decision will be appealed to the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and that legal analysts believe the case will
ultimately go the United States Supreme Court. William Claiborne, Judge Strikes
Some CaliforniaImmigration Bans, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 1995, at Al.
21. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1972).
22. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1971).
23. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982).
24. Graham, 403 U.S. at 371-72.
25. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 n.14.
26. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 40. This standard has also been referred to as the
"rationality" standard. Galloway, supra note 11, at 124. However, this note uses
the term "traditional."
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to bear some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes.""
This standard is more deferential to the state's judgment than the
strict scrutiny standard.2
The third standard (referred to as intermediate or intensified
scrutiny), applies, like the traditional standard, when the right is not
fundamental and the class is not suspect. However, this third
standard is invoked when "the class affected has some similarities
to suspect or semi-suspect classes, . . . the right affected is very

important, and the disability imposed is very severe."2 9 In such
cases, the Court moves closer to the strict scrutiny standard than to
the traditional standard: the state must show not only a rational
relationship of its action to legitimate state purposes, but also that
the resulting discrimination between classes "furthers a substantial
goal of the State."3
For example, in Plyler, Texas law had prohibited state funding
of the education of children who were not "legally admitted" into
the United States.31 The Court concluded that education is not
a fundamental right.32 Nevertheless, it held that education is so
vital to our society33 and its denial is so great a hardship to the
children affected34 that, to justify its action, Texas should be held
to a stricter standard than the traditional one. Applying this
standard, the Court found that Texas' denial of education to illegal
alien children was unconstitutional because it was not shown to
further a substantial state goal.35
In deciding whether.section 7 of Proposition 187 is a denial of
Equal Protection, the Supreme Court will likely apply the same
intermediate scrutiny standard used in Plyler. Based on the
evidence now available and using that standard, the Court will

27. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 40.
28. Galloway, supra note 11, at 124.
29. Id. at 158.
30. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224.
31. Id. at 205.
32. Id. at 221. The Court also held that illegal aliens are not a suspect class.
Id. at 219 n.19.
33. Id. at 221. The Court observes that education has a "fundamental role in
maintaining the fabric of our society" and that, by denying a basic education to
illegal alien children, the Texas law "imposes a lifetime hardship on a discrete class
of children not accountable for their disabling status." Id. at 221, 223. (The
children are considered by the Court not to be accountable for their status because
they presumably did not choose to be in the state, but were brought there by
parents or guardians. Id. at 220 (relying on Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770
(1977)).
34. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223.
35. Id. at 224.
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likely conclude that the denial of public education to illegal aliens
does not sufficiently further a substantial interest of the state; as a
result, section 7 would be found to violate the Equal Protection
Clause.
In order to find in Wilson that section 7 does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court would have to reverse
its Plyler decision; there is no convincing basis on which to
distinguish it. The situation in both cases is essentially the same:
a state seeking to deny funds for public education of illegal alien
children.
In particular, differences between the state laws under
consideration in Wilson and Plyler do not provide a sufficient basis
for reaching a different result. The two laws used different mechanisms: Texas denied state funding for education of illegal alien
children, but permitted them to attend school if they paid a fee;36
California barred the children from state schools and required that
the schools report evidence of illegal aliens to federal immigration
authorities.37 However, from the perspective of Equal Protection,
these differences are superficial: both laws establish a class of
illegal alien children who are denied the same access to the public
schools that is granted to other children in the state.
California might argue that the requirement in section 7,
mandating state cooperation in the transition of an illegal alien
child to a school in the child's country of origin,38 distinguishes
section 7 from the Texas law that was struck down in Plyler, by
assuring that children will not be penalized by the state's action. 9
However, it seems likely that few, if any, children will benefit from
this provision. Illegal alien children would in all likelihood not risk
deportation by enrolling in California public schools, and therefore
could not benefit from transition assistance. The result would be
what the Plyler court was concerned about, an uneducated
population who may ultimately become legal residents or citi40
zens.

If the Supreme Court grants certiorari and hears Wilson, it is
unlikely that it would reject the conclusions in Plyler, either that
36. Id. at 206 n.2.
37. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48215 (West 1995).
38. Id. § 48215(0.
39. The Court in Plyler found it significant that the law denied a free public
education to illegal alien children who were not responsible for their illegal status
(because their parents or guardians presumably brought them into the United
States); it regarded this as a penalty imposed on "the basis of a legal characteristic
over which children can have little control." Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220.
40. Id. at 226.
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undocumented aliens are not a suspect class, or that the right to
education, although not a fundamental right, is important enough
to justify special treatment. Both conclusions were accepted in
Plyler by the dissenting justices4 as well as by the majority. 2
Finally, public discussion to date does not support a claim that
section 7 furthers a substantial interest of the state. The California
legislature found that the state is suffering economic hardship from
the presence of illegal aliens in the state.4 3 However, similar claims
by Texas of economic impact did not convince the Court in Plyler
that the Texas law furthered a substantial state interest.' The
Court pointed out that cost alone could not justify the exclusion of
illegal aliens from state schools.45

For these reasons, the Court in deciding Wilson is likely to
rely on the intermediate scrutiny standard and reach the same
result as it did in Plyler. However, as the Plyler opinion illustrates,
that standard is vague and difficult to apply in practice. For
example, Justice Brennan makes a number of arguments about the
importance of education. He points out that "[t]he inability to read
and write will handicap the individual deprived of a basic education
each and every day of his life.' '4 6 These statements are difficult to
dispute, but there is no explanation how they distinguish education
from other non-fundamental rights. As a result, the opinion offers
no guidance for those who must determine whether curtailment of
a non-fundamental right should be evaluated under the intermedi-

ate scrutiny standard or the traditional standard.
Thus, if the intermediate scrutiny analysis used in Plyler is
followed, the courts must make difficult distinctions among various
rights, all of which are non-fundamental. Equal Protection
challenges to some non-fundamental rights will be assessed based
on the traditional standard; Equal Protection challenges to other
non-fundamental rights, such as public education, will require that
the higher standard of intermediate scrutiny be met.

41. Id. at 244 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 221, 223.
43. 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 187, § 1 (no page numbers available) (West).
One study has found evidence of a net cost to the states from the presence of
illegal aliens in the schools. George J. Borjas, Know the Flow; Economics of
Immigration, NAT'L REv., Apr. 17, 1995 (no page numbers available).
44. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 227. The Court also expressed some skepticism about
the claim that, by making more funds available, exclusion of illegal aliens would
improve the overall quality of education for those legally residing in Texas. Id. at
229.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 222.
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The intermediate scrutiny standard should be abandoned.
Limiting the standards of Equal Protection review to two, traditional and strict scrutiny, would result in a bright line test. The
availability of such a test would lessen uncertainty for lawmakers,
the courts, and illegal aliens alike. The choice between the two
standards would then depend on a relatively simple determination
whether the class is suspect or not, or the right is fundamental or
not, instead of the more subjective determinations called for by
Plyler (whether the class is similar to a suspect class, the right
affected is very important, although
not fundamental, or the
47
disability imposed is very severe).
In Wilson, if intermediate scrutiny is not used, the analysis
would be straightforward, resulting in a decision that Proposition ,
187 is constitutional. Since the class of illegal aliens is not suspect
and education is not a fundamental right,48 the traditional test whether the state action bears a rational relationship to legitimate
state purposes - would apply. One of California's purposes is to
prevent economic hardship to legal residents caused by the
presence of illegal aliens.49 California could likely convince the
Court that preventing economic hardship to its citizens is a
legitimate state purpose; therefore a law such as section 7, which in
effect eliminates the cost to the state of educating illegal aliens,
bears a rational relationship to that purpose.
The foregoing discussion suggests that the intermediate
scrutiny standard is difficult to administer and that the Supreme
Court has not clearly articulated when it is to be applied. That
raises the question why the Court applied the intermediate scrutiny
standard to the Texas statute that excluded illegal alien children
from state elementary and secondary schools. The decision in
Plyler suggests that the Court was influenced by concern about the
social problem that would be created, perhaps not just for the state
but for the country as a whole, if states were to deny public
education to illegal alien children: the state's action would promote
"the creation and perpetuation of a subclass of illiterates within our
boundaries, surely adding to the problems and costs of unemployment, welfare, and crime. ' o

On the other hand, the Court's concern with the burden of
uneducated aliens within the United States discounts the heavy
47. Galloway, supra note 11, at 158.
48. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219 n.19; see supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
49. 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 187, § 1 (no page numbers available) (West
1995).
50. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230.
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financial burdens to the states if they cannot constitutionally
exclude illegal aliens from their schools.51 The costs associated
with having uneducated illegal aliens in the population to which the
Court refers in Plyler are potential;5 2 the costs of additional
children in the schools are real.
This note predicts that the Supreme Court, if it hears the
challenge to section 7 of Proposition 187, will strike it down as a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. However, in doing so,
the Court will likely rely on a legal standard, intermediate scrutiny,
that is difficult to administer because the kinds of rights to which
it applies are not clearly definable. It is important to recognize,
however, that in crafting the intermediate scrutiny standard, the
Court was grappling with difficult social issues: should American
taxpayers bear the cost of educating children who are illegal aliens
(generally because of their parents' wrongdoing, not their own), or
should these children, many of whom will remain in the United
States for the rest of their lives, whether legally or not, be left
uneducated? No matter how the Court decides Wilson as a matter
of law, these questions of social policy will remain.
Benjamin N. Bedrick

51. See supra note 5 (net cost to California in its fiscal year beginning July 1,
1994, for elementary and secondary education, Medicaid, and incarceration of
illegal immigrants, is estimated at $2.35 billion; of that total, approximately $1.6
billion is spent for education).
52. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230.

